

FIGURE 3.5 Antecedents and Consequents of Four Concepts as Measured Among Male Students by Triandis et al. (1972)

Low Power Distance Index	Antecedents of "Freedom"	High Power Distance Index
Respect of individual Equality	Tact Servitude Money	
	Consequents of "Freedom"	
	Industrial Production Disorderly Society Wealth	
Leadership Knowledge	Antecedents of "Power"	
	Wrestling	
	Consequents of "Power"	
	Cruelty	
Happiness Knowledge Love	Antecedents of "Wealth"	
	Inheritance Ancestral property High interest charges Stinginess Crime Deceit Theft	
Satisfaction Happiness	Consequents of "Wealth"	
	Fear of Thieves Arrogance Unhappiness	
Love	Antecedents of "Respect"	
	Old age	
Friendship Recognition of superiority Liking	Consequents of "Respect"	

Frequency across four countries is perfectly rank correlated with the Power Distance Index.

workers communicate to their superior?" and 42, "Is your immediate superior inclined to take into account your opinions and suggestions?"; both are negatively correlated with PDI). As in the case of the HERMES statement in favor of employee participation (B56), we see here that the formal and the informal levels should be sharply distinguished. Italy scores low on both types of participation, Yugoslavia high on formal but low on informal, Israel high on both, and Austria and the United States low on formal but higher on informal participation.

A Summary of Connotations of the Power Distance Index Found in Survey Material

At this point, the reader may feel a need for an integration of the large amount of detail in the attitudes somehow found to be related to the Power Distance Index. This integration is supplied in the summary table of Figure 3.6, which assembles the connotations of PDI found in the various survey data: what the societal norm which I called Power Distance stands for.

Figure 3.6 opposes "low PDI countries" to "high PDI countries." This is a dichotomy which serves to clarify the distinctions, but it should be kept in mind that (1) PDI is a continuum, so that countries are not just polarized between "high" and "low" but may be anywhere in between; (2) not all connotations apply with equal strength to a given country; and (3) individuals in countries show a wide range of variation around the country's societal norms (compare Figure 1.5).

With these provisos, we find in Figure 3.6 a picture of two types of societal norms which start from the values parents hold for their children. It is likely that especially the father-child relationship is the model for the degree of power distance which a society expects, although the corresponding values are also held by mothers (Kohn, 1969: 42). Corresponding differences in attitudes of young people (students)—for example, conformity versus independence and higher versus lower authoritarianism—show that the parental values have been internalized by these young people. In work organizations, we find that managers model their decision-making behavior in accordance with these values, and that subordinates feel more comfortable with managers who correspond to the model. Subordinates' feelings about close or loose supervision are complemented by the prevalent image of man as someone who likes or dislikes work as an activity per se. Subordinates' preferences for the decision-making style of their boss reflect the kind of supervision the majority of them feels most comfortable with, with one exception. In the high PDI countries, some subordinates switch to the other extreme and express a preference for a majority rule decision-making system in which the manager does not manage at all. I interpreted this earlier as a counterdependent subordinate reaction, which means that in high PDI countries, subordinates tend to polarize between dependence and counterdependence versus their boss; in low PDI countries, they center on interdependence (consultative decision-making). The societal norm affects the self-image which managers prefer, but also the emotional distance between superior and subordinate and the amount of consideration which subordinates find in their superiors. All these differences point to a greater power inequality in high than in low PDI countries, which is not only maintained by the more powerful but also desired by many of the less powerful. Still, great inequality is considered problematic at the same time, and students in higher PDI countries show negative associations not only with "power" but also with "wealth" (in the following sections we shall go deeper into the association of power inequality and wealth inequality). People in higher PDI countries are more open to ideological solutions to an inequality which is felt as problematic, but for which daily interactions between more and less powerful people offer no alternative. Ideas of worker participation in management are more strongly endorsed on the

FIGURE 3.6 Summary of Connotations of Power Distance Index Differences Found in Survey Research

See page	Low PDI Countries	High PDI Countries
87	Parents put less value on children's obedience.	Parents put high value on children's obedience.
85	Students put high value on independence.	Students put high value on conformity.
87	Authoritarian attitudes in students are a matter of personality.	Students show authoritarian attitudes as a social norm.
74	Managers seen as making decisions after consulting with subordinates.	Managers seen as making decisions autocratically and paternalistically.
88	Close supervision negatively evaluated by subordinates.	Close supervision positively evaluated by subordinates.
83	Stronger perceived work ethic; strong disbelief that people dislike work.	Weaker perceived work ethic; more frequent belief that people dislike work.
89	Managers more satisfied with participative superior.	Managers more satisfied with directive or persuasive superior.
75	Subordinates' preference for manager's decision-making style clearly centered on consultative, give-and-take style.	Subordinates' preference for manager's decision-making style polarized between autocratic-paternalistic and majority rule.
85	Managers like seeing themselves as practical and systematic; they admit a need for support.	Managers like seeing themselves as benevolent decision makers.
73	Employees less afraid of disagreeing with their boss.	Employees fear to disagree with their boss.
88	Employees show more cooperativeness.	Employees reluctant to trust each other.
82	Managers seen as showing more consideration.	Managers seen as showing less consideration.
89	Students have positive associations with "power" and "wealth."	Students have negative associations with "power" and "wealth."
82	Mixed feeling about employees' participation in management.	Ideological support for employees' participation in management.
86	Mixed feelings among managers about the distribution of capacity for leadership and initiative.	Ideological support among managers for a wide distribution of capacity for leadership and initiative.
90	Informal employee consultation possible without formal participation.	Formal employee participation possible without informal consultation.
77	Higher-educated employees hold much less authoritarian values than lower-educated ones.	Higher- and lower-educated employees show similar values about authority.

"desirable" level. Managers in high PDI countries are more ready to admit a wide distribution of capacities for leadership and initiative among people, but this may be because their reference group is more narrowly limited to their own class. As the Yugoslav example shows, formal employee participation in management is possible in high PDI countries, but it does not affect the pattern of informal employee consultation. Finally, it is in the low PDI countries that attitudes toward power distance are most class-dependent; in the high PDI countries all classes share the high PDI norm. In the low PDI countries it is really only the middle and perhaps the upper classes that hold low PDI values; the lower classes do not.

THE POWER DISTANCE NORM, ITS ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES

The Power Distance Norm

It is time now to step back from the data and try to describe the general societal norm which is behind the "low PDI" and "high PDI" syndromes. This is an exercise in induction, which means that I have completed the picture with elements based on intuition rather than on empirical evidence, much like an archaeologist completes ancient pottery from which shards are missing. The total picture is given in Figure 3.7. The societal norm is meant to be a value system shared by a majority in the middle classes in a society. It contains both values as the desirable and values as the desired and is only at some distance followed by reality. All the provisos of the previous section apply: Most countries are in between, not all statements apply equally strongly in all countries, and individuals in countries vary widely around the norm.

The PDI norm deals with the desirability or undesirability of inequality and of dependence versus interdependence in society. Both low and high PDI countries have hierarchies, but they mean something else: The basic values with regard to inequality are projected onto the hierarchical relationship and make it into a convenience arrangement on one side, and an existential arrangement on the other.

The values about inequality are coupled with values about the exercise of power. The statement that in high PDI countries power is a basic fact of society which antedates good or evil and whose legitimacy is irrelevant is taken from Martyn-Johns (1977: 350), who compares a "European" with a "Javanese" (Indonesian) concept of power, and who has been inspired by B. R. Anderson. This may, in fact, be true in all societies. Crozier (1973: 223) states: "[P]ower in its noble aspects arises out of dubious negotiations, and has to rely on blackmail in its exercise. The established order of things is merely the ratified outcome of prior relationships in which blackmail played a major role." Mulder (1977: 15) has shown in his laboratory experiments that people react to illegitimate power in the same way they react to legitimate power. However, I propose that in some societies (which I call high PDI) power needs less legitimization than in others (which I call low PDI). The difference is more clearly visible on the next issue in Figure 3.7: whether powerholders should obey the same rules as others. Does the president of the company use a time-clock card if the workers do so? Does he have a private toilet? Should the general legitimate himself to the sentry? In low PDI countries, power is something of which power holders are almost ashamed and which they will try to underplay. I heard a Swedish university official state that in order to exercise power, he tries not to look powerful. This theory definitely does not

FIGURE 3.7 The Power Distance Societal Norm

Power Distance	
Low PDI	High PDI
• Inequality in society should be minimized. • All should be interdependent. • Hierarchy means an inequality of roles, established for convenience. • Subordinates are people like me. • Superiors are people like me. • The use of power should be legitimate and is subject to the judgment between good and evil. • All should have equal rights. • Powerful people should try to look less powerful than they are. • Stress on reward, legitimate and expert power. • The system is to blame. • The way to change a social system is by redistributing power. • People at various power levels feel less threatened and more prepared to trust people. • Latent harmony between the powerful and the powerless. • Cooperation among the powerless can be based on solidarity.	• There should be an order of inequality in this world in which everyone has his rightful place; high and low are protected by this order. • A few should be independent; most should be dependent. • Hierarchy means existential inequality. • Superiors consider subordinates as being of a different kind. • Subordinates consider superiors as being of a different kind. • Power is a basic fact of society which antedates good or evil. Its legitimacy is irrelevant. • Powerholders are entitled to privileges. • Powerful people should try to look as powerful as possible. • Stress on coercive and referent power. • The underdog is to blame. • The way to change a social system is by dethroning those in power. • Other people are a potential threat to one's power and rarely can be trusted. • Latent conflict between powerful and the powerless. • Cooperation among the powerless is difficult to bring about because of low faith in people norm.

hold in Belgium or France. I once met the Dutch prime minister with his caravan on a camping site in Portugal; I could not very well see his French or Italian colleague in that situation.

We owe to French and Raven (1959) a well-known classification of the bases of social power into five types: reward power, coercive power, legitimate power (based on rules), referent power (based on personal charisma of the powerful and identification with him or her by the less powerful), and expert (specialist) power. I surmise that, other things being equal, there will be more coercive and referent power used in the high PDI societies and more reward, legitimate, and expert power in the low PDI societies.

The statement that in high PDI countries the underdog is the first to be blamed for anything wrong in the system whereas in low PDI countries the system is blamed is inspired by a research review about Latin America and India from Negandhi and Prasad (1971: 105). I have noticed this tendency in some European countries as well. On the other hand, the blame may revert to the powerful, and this is the "revolution" philosophy on the high PDI side: Change the top person and you change the system. This is a popular "solution" in organizations, although in reality problems often survive after leaders fall.

The final statement in Figure 3.7 recognizes a latent conflict between the powerful and the powerless on the high PDI side; a basic mistrust which may never explode but is always present. On the low PDI side, there is an ideal model of harmony between the powerful and powerless which in practice may be as "latent" as the conflict on the other side; that is, it does not exclude *de facto* conflict, but the conflict tends to be pragmatic rather than fundamental.

Predictors of PDI: Latitude, Population Size, and Wealth

The statistical analysis shows that across the 40 countries, 43 percent of the variance in PDI can be predicted from the geographical latitude (of the country's capital) alone; 51 percent can be predicted from a combination of latitude and population size, and 58 percent from latitude, population size, plus wealth (1970 GNP/capita). The second column in Figure 3.1 lists the values of PDI which would be predicted in this latter case. The mean absolute prediction error is 10 points; the maximum error, 31 points (for Israel).

That geographical latitude is the strongest predictor of PDI (with negative sign) may be surprising. However, a country's geographical position is a fundamental fact which is bound to have a strong effect on the subjective culture of its inhabitants, as this culture was shaped over many generations. Even when people migrate, they usually prefer migrating to a climatic zone not very different from the one they leave, which means a roughly similar latitude (north or south). The logic of the relationship between latitude (by definition an independent variable) and power distance is, of course, a matter of educated speculation. In any case, latitude should be seen as a rough global indicator of climate (tropical—moderate—cold). In my interpretation of the latitude-power distance relationship, the key intervening variable is the need for technology as a condition for survival. Human survival in colder climates presupposes protection against the hardships of nature, which means that only those people survived who were able to master the minimal technical skills necessary for survival. In warmer climates the need for technology was less. This difference is at the beginning of a causal chain which is pictured in Figure 3.8 and which leads to two different dominant types of social structure.

Some would probably attribute the effect of climate on human society primarily to its impact on man's physical performance; a tropical climate would make people less inclined to work (Myrdal, 1968: 2136; Bandyopadhyaya, 1978). I rather believe that in the long term with which we are dealing here, the human species is highly adaptable; if man performs less in tropical countries this is not because he could not become a high performer there, but because there was less of a need for it.

[96]

[97]

The (positive) relationship between PDI and our second predictor, population size, can be interpreted in two ways; large population size can be classified both as a consequence and as an origin of large Power Distance. The question is, why have some small nations remained independent while others have been absorbed into large states? Obviously, military accidents have played an important role, but the will to be independent is an indispensable ingredient which in the long term has often proved stronger than military violence. It is not difficult to see a link between the will to be independent as a small nation and the maintenance of small power distances in other institutions. Thus, small population size can be a consequence of a small power distance norm. On the other hand, once a large nation exists, its members will have to accept a political power which is more distant and less accessible than for a small nation (Dahl and Tufte, 1974: 87). This should then reinforce a norm in society of less questioning of authority in general—that is, a larger power distance.

Wealth, itself highly correlated with latitude, is the third predictor of PDI, with negative sign, after the effects of latitude and population size have been eliminated. Wealth, too, can be interpreted as both a consequence and an origin of smaller power distances. National wealth is obviously associated with a whole complex of other factors. A study by Adelman and Morris (1967) in which they factor-analyzed 24 economic, social, and political indicators for 74 noncommunist developing countries found a first factor with a .73 loading on GNP per capita in 1961 and with, among others, the following other loadings:

- .89 (small) size of the traditional agricultural sector.
- .88 extent of mass communication
- .86 extent of social mobility
- .86 extent of literacy
- .84 extent of urbanization
- .82 importance of the middle class

[Adelman and Morris, 1967: Table IV-1].


Adelman and Morris also showed a separate factor analysis for the 25 relatively most developed countries out of their set, including (from our set) Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Greece, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Peru, Taiwan, Turkey, and Venezuela. This time they found a first factor with a .82 loading on GNP per capita in 1961 and with loadings above .60 on the same variables as mentioned above (except urbanization, which was left out of the analysis), plus the following:

- .85 level of modernization of techniques in agriculture
- .72 strength of the labor movement
- .70 extent of centralization of political power
- .70 political strength of the military
- .69 degree of modernization of outlook
- .61 level of modernization of industry

[Adelman and Morris, 1967: Table VII-5].

This analysis adds to our list for these more developed countries three more items dealing with technological development (level of modernization in agriculture, degree of modernization of outlook, and level of modernization of industry) as well as three items directly related to the role of the elites: Centralization of political power

FIGURE 3.8 Origins of National Power Distance Index Differences



and political strength of the military are negatively related to wealth, and strength of the labor movement—that is, a countervailing power—is positively related to wealth. All three, evidently, are conceptually related to power distance; the first two positively, the third negatively. I have fitted them into the causal chain of Figure 3.8.

Power Distance and Income Inequality

A linking variable between wealth and small power distance is most likely also “small wealth distance,” or the distribution of wealth among the strata of the population. Greater wealth presupposes higher technology; higher technology calls for higher-educated but also better-paid lower and middle strata; so wealth will be more equally distributed and power also will be more equally distributed. In order to test this I looked for data on income inequality by country and found three studies covering between eight and 12 of the HERMES countries each (Kravis, 1960; Kuznets, 1963; Bégue, 1976). As the statistical analysis shows, all three show significant rank correlations between income inequality and PDI (but in the most recent study, this was only true for income inequality *after tax*). The correlation coefficients are .89, .86, and .57.

Brossard and Maurice (1974) have published data for carefully matched pairs of industrial manufacturing units in France and Germany. Wage differentials (upper percentile divided by lower decile) were between 3.7 and 5.5 in France, and between 2.0 and 2.3 in Germany. This is in line with the PDI difference between the two countries.

It seems that on the level of societies, inequality in power and inequality in wealth go hand in hand. The greater the power inequality, the greater the wealth inequality, and vice versa. Larger or smaller inequality in wealth is one of the elements in the causal chain that helps to explain the power distance syndrome (Figure 3.8).

Power Distance and Educational Systems

We have seen that across occupations in HERMES, PDI and average years of formal education are strongly negatively related (Figure 3.2). Across countries in HERMES (and keeping occupations constant), PDI and years of formal education are *positively* correlated (see page 83). However, this is a different story: Within the same occupations, the educational levels of HERMES employees vary only marginally, and in the poorer (high PDI) countries there is a relative oversupply of people with long formal schooling for these jobs. We can still assume PDI to be correlated with the average level of education in the country at large, not within HERMES. In the causal chain of Figure 3.8, education appears more in lower PDI countries because it is needed more. It is associated with a need for mastery of technology, which is a characteristic of the social system.

One measure of the mastery of technology in a country is the number of Nobel prize winners in the physical sciences which this country has produced. Moulin (1961) has composed a “Nobel Index” which divides the number of Nobel prizewinners between 1901 and 1960 in physics, chemistry, medicine, and physiology by the average number of inhabitants of the country in millions. On Moulin's list 20 countries appear, from which 17 are in the HERMES sample,⁸ but I have eliminated those with a 1970 GNP/capita below \$1300 because these poorer countries are unlikely to

have had adequate laboratories to really compete. However, I have added wealthy countries not on the list because they never had a Nobel prizewinner. The only country in this category is Norway, which makes us wonder about possible biases in the Nobel prize's Swedish judges!⁹ Across 14 countries,¹⁰ the Nobel Index rank correlates with $\rho = -.50$ with PDI.¹¹ Thus there tends to have been more mastery of the sciences in the twentieth century in countries which in 1970 showed lower PDI values (Peyrefitte, 1976: 194, quotes Moulin's study to illustrate “the French disease”: high PDI France only appears ninth on the Nobel Index list).

In spite of this evidence of a correlation of PDI with peak scientific performance, the crucial aspect of a country's educational system which is logically linked with the Power Distance norm is not the relative number of top educated scholars. They could just form another elite. The crucial aspect is the educational level of the rank and file which contribute to the middle strata in society. Mulder (1976: 92) argues that in order to learn power distance reduction it is necessary that there be intermediary levels in between the powerful and the powerless (compare page 71). Gaspari and Millendorfer (1978: 198) use the ratio between the number of secondary school students and the number of university students as a measure of the development of middle strata. Northern and Western European countries show over time a development toward higher ratios (more secondary school students), while Eastern European countries (but also Italy) show permanent low ratios (a relative predominance of higher education—that is, the formation of a relative elite). The other indicator used by Gaspari and Millendorfer (1978: 199) is the average number of nurses per doctor in a country. Across 15 countries this rank-correlates $-.52$ with PDI (but it correlates even more with UAI and IDV; thus, I shall deal with it in Chapter 4 rather than here).

Education is, of course, not only a matter of numbers: numbers of years at school or numbers of students. It is very important what is taught and how. On the high PDI side where children are more dependent on parents we will find more frequently that students are dependent on teachers. There is more rote learning, and the asking of questions by the student is seldom encouraged; teachers are more often supposed to be omniscient, even if they do not like it. This is by no means limited to children; as a professor in international institutes of learning, I am less challenged by my French than by my Swedish doctoral students. In my classes for middle managers, participation in the discussion depends, of course, on people's mother tongues; but on the average, Englishmen or Danes participate more even if the course is in French than do French or French Swiss if the course is in English. The influence of the French educational system on the maintenance of large power distances has been widely commented upon (see for example Schonfeld, 1976; Marceau, 1977; Maurice et al., 1978). In French organizations, the educational difference between lower- and higher-level employees is confirmed and perpetuated in their different legal status: higher-educated employees become “cadres” and lower-educated “non-cadres,” and the transfer between the two groups is very difficult. In one of my classes for French managers, a participant described the difference between “cadres” and “non-cadres” as follows: “*Les cadres ont la logique de l'efficacité, les non-cadres de la contestation.*”¹²

PDI and Historical Factors

Latitude, population size, and wealth leave 42 percent of the variance in Power Distance Index unexplained. This unexplained part of the variance contains the part due to measurement error, to idiosyncracies of the sample of multinational company respondents (nonrepresentativeness for the population of their country), and to factors working on the level of national systems but unrelated to latitude, population size, and wealth.

Figure 3.1 shows that the countries deviating most from the predicted values of PDI (more than 15 points above or below) are Belgium (+29), France (+26), Yugoslavia (+23), Philippines (+21), Israel (-31), Austria (-29), and Pakistan (-19). Yugoslavia is a special case because the PDI data used are from another organization with a different subculture. It is likely that the multinational organization's subculture is characterized by a relatively more open communication with superiors than most other work organizations. Therefore, other work organizations in the same countries can be expected to show higher PDI values. That in Yugoslavia, in spite of worker-self-management, the *informal* relationship between subordinates and superiors is not so participative has been shown by Tannenbaum et al. (1974: 77; compare page 90).

The high scores for Belgium and France make them fit well into a cluster of Latin countries, which includes both those in Latin Europe and Latin America. All Latin countries in Europe show higher PDI values, while all Germanic countries (including the English-speaking ones) show lower PDI values. Latin languages indicate the cultural inheritance of the Roman Empire. Half of Belgium speaks Dutch, a Germanic language, but until recently the French language and culture in this country have been strongly dominant. (I shall deal in more detail with the value differences between the linguistic groups in Belgium in Chapter 7.)

In the Latin countries of Europe, the Roman Empire was the first large and effective state to be established. In the same way as early childhood experiences have a major impact on personality, these early societal experiences must have had a lasting impact on polity, affecting all institutions that have followed. In the Roman Empire, the emperor had absolute authority and stood above the law: "[B]y an implied contract the people confer upon the emperor all power and authority over them so that his will has the force of the law" (Smith, 1964: 272).¹³ When the Roman Empire disintegrated, this absolute authority of the ruler was also taken over by the Germanic invaders of France who mixed with the Romanized population (Pirenne, 1939: 32), but not by the Germanic Anglo-Saxon invaders of Britain who chased the Romanized Celts without mixing with them. In the Germanic tradition, the power of the king was subordinate to the assembly of free men. In this tradition, an absolutist rule could never settle in Britain; when the Norman kings attempted to establish it, they were forced to recognize the rights of the people in the Magna Charta of 1214 (1939: 257). In Germany up until the nineteenth century, a central authority could never be established, and the country was composed of small principalities.

Jordan (1973: 69) claims that the Roman and Germanic traditions also divided Europe by their different inheritance laws. In the former Roman Empire, the practice of divided inheritance was long dominant; land and other possessions were di-

vided equally among all heirs, leading to all children remaining on ever-smaller farms and a need for birth control. In Germanic and English common law, land was usually inherited by the oldest son only, with the remaining offspring being compensated in other ways, if at all (a familiar picture from several of Grimm's German fairytales). This led in a much later stage of history to emigration and urbanization of the younger children.¹⁴ "The younger sons have made England great" (Sauvy, 1966: 26). The differences in population growth among the four largest European countries between 1720 and 1970 are startling (Jordan, 1973: 72): France—19 to 50 million, growth factor 2.6; Italy—13 to 53 million, growth factor 4.1; Germany (East and West)—14 to 77 million, growth factor 5.5; and Great Britain—seven to 55 million, growth factor 7.9.

France had by far the slowest population increase (at the same time, it supplied fewer overseas migrants than the other countries); this has been a matter of lower birthrates (that is, of voluntary birth prevention), as death rates in France were not systematically different from those in other countries (Sauvy, 1966: 54). The French-speaking part of Belgium had an equally slow population increase. In the causal chain of Figure 3.8 I have linked slower population increases with a more static society. It is also likely that smaller family sizes mean that parental authority weighs heavier on the children who remain more dependent.

The difference in inheritance laws between Germanic and Latin Europe also exists between Japan and China (Hsu, 1971: 38). The existence of one-son inheritance in Japan is used to explain the faster rate of modernization by the energy of the younger sons who had to find other activities. On the other hand, in the Chinese tradition, the people had the right to judge the ruler; in the Japanese tradition the emperor was unimpeachable (Azumi, 1974: 517). In this respect Japan is more like the Latin/China, like the Germanic countries. On the PDI scale we see that, all in all, the scores for Japan and the part of China on which data were available—Taiwan—are about the same, in spite of the much lower wealth of the latter. Unfortunately we lack data on mainland China; however, a recent perceptive study by Laaksonen (1977) describes work relationships as quite participative but party relationships as strongly hierarchical, which leads to estimating for China a total Power Distance score somewhere in the middle of the scale—not very far from Taiwan and Japan.

The Chinese settlements of Singapore and Hong Kong show much higher PDIs, but these are (ex-)colonies. Two other recently independent states, India and the Philippines, also show high PDI values. Modern organizations in the colonial countries were set up by the colonial rulers. Even rulers like the British, who practiced democracy and lower power distance society at home, did not practice equality between themselves and the colonial populations. This kind of inconsistency of values is quite common in human society (Béteille, 1969). The Power Distance Index definitely does *not* measure tolerance toward other races, religions, and so on; this is rather a matter of Uncertainty Avoidance (see Chapter 4). In the ex-colonies of Asia, the places of the colonists were taken by local managers who adopted the existing management style (Kakar, 1971). However, traditional pre-colonial relationships also contained elements of large inequality: There is no better example than the Indian caste system. Kumar and Singh (1976: 22) conclude that in India's highly stratified society, "constructs regarding superiority-subordinacy tend to dominate

alternate patterns of categorization." Heginbotham (1975) in the Indian State of Tamil Nadu finds four different and conflicting "cognitive models of organization" from which both the traditional Indian and the British colonial model stress vertical relationships.

Among the former colonies, the Philippines show an extremely high PDI score; contrary to the others, it used to be a Latin (Spanish) rather than a British colony, which may explain the additional stress on inequality. Pakistan, on the other hand, scores relatively low and lower than predicted. It may be that the Pakistani sample, one of the smallest in the data set, is particularly enlightened compared with its environment; although it is predictable that Pakistan, the Muslim part of the former British Colonial subcontinent, would stress stratification less than the predominantly Hindu part, India: in Islam, all believers are equal before God.

The other countries that deviate particularly from their predicted PDI values are Israel and Austria. There are cultural links between the two: The modern state of Israel was founded by an Austrian, Theodor Herzl, and in the intellectual life in Austria until the Nazi period the Jewish part of the intelligentsia played a key role. The low PDI score for Israel makes intuitive sense for a society which developed the kibbutz system. The very low score for Austria is surprising, but the position of Austria becomes clearer if we also take its Uncertainty Avoidance score into account (which is fairly high: see Chapter 4). The egalitarian ethos in Austria is recognizable in its stable socialist majority (see the next section).¹⁵

The historical factors mentioned fill some missing links in the hypothesized causal chain of Figure 3.8.

PDI and Political Systems

A large factor-analytical study of country data has been performed on political systems by Gregg and Banks (1965). Their factor analysis used 68 aspects of political systems for 115 countries. They found a strong first factor (explaining 25 percent of the total variance), which they called "access." It has, among others, the following loadings:

.94	electoral system
.93	constitutional regime
.92	group opposition
.86	horizontal power distribution
.85	representativeness of regime
.80	press freedom
-.81	not a totalitarian regime

This main dimension of political systems corresponds to Aron's (1965) distinction between constitutional-pluralistic and monopolistic regimes, or to Cutright's (1967) "Political Representativeness Index."

A measure for the 40 countries on this measure around 1970 was not available, but I could, without much ambiguity, dichotomize the 40 countries into 20 with "balanced power in government" and 20 with "unbalanced power," basing the dichotomy on historical events in the period 1950-1975. As the statistical analysis shows, the "balanced versus unbalanced power" split is highly significantly associated with

PDI. We could add "politics": balanced power = 1, unbalanced = 2, as a fourth variable to the explanations of PDI beyond latitude, population size, and wealth. In this way we can explain another five percent of the variance (up to a total of 63 percent). However, the question is whether the country's political system really "explains" the PDI or whether both the political system and the PDI scores are symptoms of the same underlying societal norm. I hold the latter interpretation more reasonable. Eisenstadt (1974) has stressed that the world shows a great variety of political systems without signs of convergence and subject to the influence of historical and cultural continuities; the main dimensions of national culture, of which Power Distance is only one, should also be reflected in differences in political systems. Political decision-making depends to a large extent on factors other than political systems. Haniff (1976) has shown, for example, that social policy outputs, as measured by the expenditure of funds for citizen welfare, across 125 sovereign states could be predicted from wealth and literacy rather than from political variables.

Political systems, unless imposed by foreign violence, reflect something about the values and the behavior of the population. Low power distances are more likely to be associated with a certain consensus among the population which reduces disruptive conflicts. In the statistical section, I have correlated the HERMES indices with three independent measures of domestic political violence across 37, 37, and 10 countries (Rummel, 1963; Nesvold, 1969; Schneider and Schneider, 1971). All correlations with PDI are highly significantly positive (.39, .71, and .93). In the two studies covering 37 countries each, we can see that especially the countries in the lower third of the PDI range show less political violence and are responsible for the correlation; more violence is found both in the middle and in the upper third of PDI countries (such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, France, India, Iran, Italy, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela). In the more recent history of the 1970s it looks as if countries in the *middle* part of the PDI scale had the most problems of governmental instability: Argentina, Chile, Greece, Iran, Italy, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, and Thailand. Countries higher in the PDI range tend to have relatively stable, authoritarian governments; those lower in PDI, relatively stable, pluralist systems (an exception may be India). In the middle-range countries, governments can no longer count on the dependence needs of an increasing section of the population, especially of the new middle classes. These countries swing back and forth between egalitarian and elitist regimes; and elitist rulers often revert to downright oppression and totalitarianism to maintain their position.

Stavig and Barnett (1977) have demonstrated across 75 nations that one of the measures of domestic conflict we used (Rummel's scores) also correlates with the country's population size; the same is true for *foreign* conflict. This fits with the correlation found between PDI and population size. In larger countries, consensus between citizens is less easily achieved, and for outside relations, the use of power is more easily considered. Levinson (1977: 760), reviewing anthropological cross-cultural studies, relates the frequency of aggression to a warm climate; this fits with the correlation between PDI and latitude.

The relationship with PDI should be found not only in the occurrence of instability, however. For countries in which a more or less stable parliamentary system exists,

this too will reflect the country's power distance norm. In high PDI parliamentary countries such as France, Italy and Japan we see a polarization between left and right with a weak center (just as with the preferences for managers' decision-making styles in HERMES discussed earlier); in lower PDI countries such as Sweden, Germany, and Britain we see more votes to center parties or support to center tendencies within broad left and right parties. Also, in France, Italy, and Japan the government parties have nearly always been right of the middle; in which "right" stands for not stressing equality and "left" for stressing equality. Most low PDI countries have frequently had left-wing-dominated governments. In France and Italy, administrative elites are distinctively *unrepresentative* of the total population as far as their social origins are concerned, much more so than in Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States (Aberbach and Putnam, 1977). An outcome of this pattern may be that in France and Japan taxation has less of an equalizing effect on incomes than in most other countries (in France, it has an *unequalizing* effect). Such differences based on legislation ("positive law," see Northrop, 1962: 427) only reflect differences in societal norms ("living law"). We finally can trace the PDI norm also in the kind of labor movement a country has; many high PDI countries have no free labor unions at all, but unions are organized by government. In such countries as France and Italy which have free labor unions, these tend to be ideologically based and involved in politics more than in lower PDI countries, where unions tend to be more pragmatically oriented toward earnings, working conditions, and employment security. Maurice et al. (1978), comparing France and Germany, show that the different industrial relations systems of the two countries are part of the total pattern that maintains and is maintained by greater inequality in France than in Germany.

PDI and Religion, Ideology, and Theories of Power

Power distance norm differences are definitely associated with aspects of religious life, but it is doubtful whether religion can "explain" PDI; power distances and religion should be seen rather as results of a common cause. In Europe, there is a striking similarity between the limits of the Roman Empire and the limits of the Roman Catholic Church¹⁶; with few exceptions, the various reformations have been successful only in countries or areas not once under Roman rule.¹⁷ We see this even in Germany and the Netherlands.¹⁸ For power distance (and other cultural dimensions) the Empire appears to have been more decisive than the Church, as can be seen by the fact that Ireland (Catholic but not Latin) scores similar to Britain (mainly Protestant but also not Latin). However, once a religion has been established in a country, it will reinforce the values that led to its being adopted. Catholicism with the supreme authority of the Pope and the intermediate authority of the priest corresponds more to a large power distance than Protestantism with its general priesthood of the believers. Max Weber (1930, [1976]: 224) quotes a seventeenth-century Puritan Protestant text about "the sinfulness of the belief in authority, which is only permissible in the form of an impersonal authority." In *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Weber links Protestantism with the capitalist modernization of countries; this fits the low PDI side of Figure 3.8.

In Asia, I have used religion as a factor to explain the difference in power distance

between Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India: Islam is more egalitarian. However, this religious difference was merely the outcome of a historical development in which certain castes embraced Islam, so that the Muslim part of the population was more homogeneous caste-wise. In present-day India, the caste system with its power distance aspect is a more fundamental element of society than the Hindu religion; Christians and Muslims have become absorbed in it and accepted the status of new castes (Srinivas, 1969). In Japan, Confucianism was imported from China; it helps to explain the respect for a vertical hierarchy (Yoshimori, 1976: 6), but it is questionable whether it would have been imported if the hierarchical norm did not already exist (Kawasaki, 1969: 208).

In ideological and philosophical thinking, we find different theories about power in high PDI and in low PDI countries. Among the classics, Machiavelli (1517 [1955]) has given us the picture *par excellence* of the high PDI society. Machiavelli identified with the powerful; more recent authors who did the same are Mosca (Delle Piane, 1968) and Pareto (1976), Italians like Machiavelli, and Michels with his "iron law of oligarchy" (1915) (the latter, although German, lived and worked in Italy). I referred earlier to another classical author, de la Boétie (1548 [1976]), who also wrote from a high PDI viewpoint but identified with the powerless. Not infrequently, authors from a high PDI background identified with the powerless when they were young (de La Boétie was 16 when he wrote his *Discours de la Servitude Volontaire*), but switched to the powerful when they grew old. All these authors are "elitists." To them, power is a zero-sum entity; one can only obtain it by taking it from someone else.

In the low PDI countries, we tend to find "pluralist" theories. The phenomenon of polarization between the powerful and the powerless, between wealthy and poor, is considered a fact, but an undesirable one. The pluralists usually assume that power can be shared and that power distances can be reduced. This presupposes a range of intermediate strata between the powerful and the powerless; these strata tend to exist in the small PDI countries. We find in this category Thomas More (*Utopia*, 1516 [1965]) and, among modern social scientists, Mulder (1976, 1977) and A. Tannenbaum (1968). The latter explicitly defends a non-zero-sum theory of power in which all parties can gain. Within the group of pluralists we may also place those who try to reduce power distance by formal means (as in the case of the German *Mitbestimmung*)—we find these in Germany. I would classify in this category Marx and Engels (1848 [1974]) and Weber (Gerth and Mills, 1948). Marx believes that once the powerless replace the powerful, power distribution will be equal. Weber pictures a system of impersonal rules to which the use of power is tied and which protects both the more and the less powerful. Pluralists who want to reduce power distance by informal means are found in the United States ("participative management"; Likert 1967) or in Britain (sociotechnical systems; Miller, 1976). I shall come back to the formal-informal distinction in Chapter 4.

In the terminology of Machiavelli, the high PDI countries apply a "lions" approach to the exercise of power; the low PDI countries, a "foxes" approach. To Pareto, only the "lions" approach led to stability; but it must be recognized that Pareto came from a "lions" country. To authors like Mulder and Likert, only a "foxes" approach leads to stability; but they come from "foxes" countries. Where "lions" and "foxes" value systems clash within the same society it becomes unstable, as we have seen in the previous section.

PDI and Organizations

People familiar with organizations in different countries are often struck by the variety of organizational solutions to the same task problem. That is, organizational structures, other factors being equal, vary between countries. Yet there is a lack of empirically tested data on how national culture affects organizational structure. Studies of a broad spectrum of countries—essential for generalization—are lacking completely; what is available is comparisons of organizations in two or three countries at a time.

Organizational structures are in themselves very complex phenomena. The study of organizational structures has been influenced considerably by the work since 1961 of a group of researchers originally concentrated at the University of Aston in Birmingham, Great Britain, who developed standardized measuring methods (Pugh, 1976; Pugh and Hickson, 1976; Pugh and Hinings, 1976; see also Chapter 2). Basing their study on data from a large number of work organizations, first in Britain and later in other countries, the Aston group researchers established an empirical taxonomy of organizational structures. The two main dimensions of this taxonomy are "structuring of activities" (including standardization, specialization, and formalization) and "concentration of authority" (which includes centralization). These two dimensions seem to apply across all kinds of organization in all kinds of environments. The Aston researchers related their structural dimensions to various aspects of what they call the "organizational context" (including organizational size and technology). In a later stage of the Aston research, when it spread to other countries, the issue was raised of the relationship between and the relative influence of contextual versus cultural influences on organizational structures. This issue is known as the "culture-free thesis" (Child and Kieser, 1979), a somewhat misleading term because the Aston authors did not claim that culture does not affect structure, only that relationships between context and structure will be stable across societies. "Simply stated, if Indian organizations were found to be less formalized than American ones, bigger Indian units would still be more formalized than smaller Indian units" (Hickson et al. 1974: 59). So the issue is whether the effects of culture and context are additive or interactive; whether culture affects the *degree* to which structural characteristics are present or (also) the *relationship* between structural characteristics and organizational context factors.

The Power Distance norm as measured by the PDI is clearly conceptually related to the Aston dimension of "concentration of authority." A values complex as pervasive as Power Distance would be very unlikely not to affect organizational structures. Some evidence is present in the data reported by Brossard and Maurice (1974) about carefully matched industrial manufacturing plants in France (a high PDI country) and Germany (a low PDI country). These authors clearly show a difference between the two countries on variables related to the "concentration of authority" dimension, with greater concentration in France. French plants tended to have five hierarchical levels against the German's three; French plants had an average of 26 percent of personnel in management and specialist roles; German plants, 16 percent. A similar difference in number of hierarchical levels was reported by Negandhi and Prasad (1971: 60) between Indian-owned and American-owned plants in India, which is also in line with the PDI difference between India and the United States. On page 98, I

FIGURE 3.9 Consequences of National Power Distance Index Differences

Low PDI	High PDI
Consequences for Political Systems	
• Pluralist governments based on outcome of majority votes • No sudden changes in form of government (evolution and stability) • Political parties exist and tend to be in the center with relatively weak left and right wings • Government is frequently led by parties stressing equality, usually social democrats • Tax system aims at redistributing wealth • Free labor unions exist and tend to be pragmatically oriented	• Autocratic or oligarchic governments • Sudden changes in form of government (revolution and/or instability) • If political parties exist, there is a polarization between left and right with a weak center. • If government is based on election results, it tends to be led by parties not stressing equality (rightwing). • Tax system protects the wealthy • If free labor unions exist, these tend to be ideologically based and involved in politics.
Consequences for Religious Life and Philosophical and Ideological Thinking	
• Success of religions stressing equality • Ideologies of power equalization • Pluralist theorists about society • Non-zero-sum theories of power • "Foxes" approach is seen as leading to stability • More, Marx, Weber, Mulder, Tannenbaum	• Success of religions stressing stratification • Ideologies of power polarization • Elitist theories about society • Zero-sum theories of power • "Lions" approach is seen as leading to stability • Machiavelli, Mosca, Pareto, Michels
Consequences for Organizations	
• Less centralization • Flatter organization pyramids • Smaller proportion of supervisory personnel • Smaller wage differentials • High qualification of lower strata • Manual work same status as clerical work	• Greater centralization • Tall organization pyramids • Large proportion of supervisory personnel • Large wage differentials • Low qualification of lower strata • White-collar jobs valued more than blue-collar jobs